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the Driver case best illustrates the truth of this statement. The number
of times Driver was convicted indicates the futility of his prison
terms. Neither deterred nor rehabilitated, he and others like him are
daily released again into society. In attempting to solve this problem,
the Driver court upholds civil commitment while refusing to allow
criminal conviction. Given the fact that the criminal law should not
punish an illness and that the chronic alcoholic is ill, the court's
reasoning becomes persuasive. Although problems are necessarily as-
sociated with this type of decision, Driver represents a more realistic
approach to this ancient problem of the criminal law21 and manifests
potential uses of the eighth amendment in other areas.
Charles R. Simons
ConPoRATioN - STocrIoLDE 's DERVATV S S - VEMFICATION RE-
QUIREMENT OF FEDERAL RuLE 23(b).-Plaintiff shareholder, a Polish
immigrant with a limited knowledge of English, received from the
management an offer to purchase her stock. Not understanding the
import of the offer, she sought the advice of her son-in-law, an invest-
ment counselor who had originally procured the stock for her. The son-
in-law immediately had misgivings about the offer, and he under-
took a comprehensive investigation of the management's operations.
He concluded that the directors were engaged in an illegal scheme to
defraud the corporation of millions of dollars and decided that the
best course for the plaintiff to follow would be to bring a derivative
suit. This she did, following the instructions of her son-in-law and an
attorney who had been hired by him. She made the affirmations in
the complaint required by Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules' and
verified the complaint pursuant to the same rule. A deposition of the
plaintiff taken by the defendants revealed that she was totally ignorant
21 The influence of the Driver case is already being felt. See Easter v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 196).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) "Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action
brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an
association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to en-
force rights which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified
by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the
transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court
of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise
have jurisdiction. The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts
of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if neces-
sary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his
failure to obtain action or the reasons for not making such effort."
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of the substance of the complaint. The defendants moved to dismiss the
action, arguing that the affidavit of verification was "sham." Affidavits
filed by the son-in-law and attorney explained the plaintiff's ignorance
of the action and detailed the history of the charges, showing a sub-
stantial basis in fact for them. In spite of these affidavits, the district
court dismissed the action "with prejudice." The Court of Appeals
affirmed,2 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Reversed
and remanded. Rule 23(b) does not require the dismissal of an action
in which a plaintiff, qualified in all respects under the rule to bring a
stockholder's suit, lacks the requisite knowledge to comprehend the
complaint she has verified. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363 (1966).
The federal rule permitting a stockholder to sue in behalf of the
corporation to vindicate rights the assertion of which the manage-
ment has refused is a synthesis of diverse policy considerations. While
affording the shareholder a means of protecting his investment from
mismanagement, the rule also protects the courts from collusive suits
and insures the corporations against spurious litigation.
The rule had its origin in an 1855 decision3 which recognized the
equitable right of a shareholder to institute a secondary action in the
federal courts on a diversity of citizenship basis. This decision, ren-
dered at a time when federal courts were not bound by substantive
state law, led to the institution of many collusive suits in these tri-
bunals. A corporation, to gain federal jurisdiction over a question
which, if brought in a state court, would lead to an unfavorable de-
cision, would place shares in the hands of a non-resident and have him
institute a derivative suit in the federal courts.
4
The growth in the number of corporate enterprises after the Civil
War, in addition to the conferment on the national tribunals in 1875 of
"federal law" questions, had the effect of threatening the federal courts
with an inundation of lawsuits if the privilege of instituting the deriva-
tive action was not curtailed. 5 Thus, the Supreme Court, in Hawes v.
Oakland," promulgated guidelines for the future institution of such
suits. These directives, which were eventually embodied in Rule 23(b),
required the allegation of stock ownership at the time of the alleged
transgression for which the complaint is brought, the denial of col-
lusion to attain federal jurisdiction, and the affirmation that all means
2 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965).
3 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
42 MooRE, FEDiERAL PRAcrICE § 28.05, at 2249 (1st ed. 1938).
D Id. at 2250.
6 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
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of rectifying the grievance within the organization itself had been ex-
hausted. Hawes also directed that the complaint be verified.7 These
requirements were necessitated by, and directed at alleviating, the
burden placed on the federal courts caused by the abuses of the
stockholder's suit on the part of the corporation. 8
But in their effect, these directives have served the equally valuable
function of preventing abuses by the stockholder and of protecting
corporations and their officers from so-called "strike suits." Such
actions, based on untenable charges, are brought by stockholders in
the hope of gaining an out-of-court settlement with the management,
which usually would rather reach such an agreement than face the
expense and damaging effects of litigation. By requiring verification of
the complaint, the federal rules discourage such suits by subjecting
the verifier to the threat of perjury prosecution.9
In light of these functions of Rule 28(b), it is apparent that the
decision of the Court in the instant case was correct. As the Court
stated, "Rule 28(b) was not written to bar derivative suits."10 It was
designed for, and has served the purpose of, permitting a stockholder
with a genuine grievance to protect his investment, whether that
stockholder be erudite or naive. The record of the case, especially the
supporting affidavits, showed that there was evidence with which to
prove the irregularities charged in the complaint. The motives of the
plaintiff and her advisors were unimpeachable. Further, as the case
presented an alleged violation of federal law, the question of collusion
was not in issue. Thus it would not have been within the spirit of
the rule to affirm the ruling of the lower court. Such a ruling would
have denied to the poor in learning the same remedy at law that is
afforded our more educated citizens.
It is unfortunate, though, that the Court did not build its decision
on firmer ground. The holding of the Court leaves the corporately
naive plaintiff, who brings an action under 28(b), in the anomalous
position of swearing to the veracity of a set of averments the truth of
which he could not possibly know. In a sense, such an affidavit under-
mines the verification requirement by depriving it of the attendant
penalty for false swearing. Perjury, the willful swearing to the truth
7 Id. at 461.
8 2 Moons, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2251.
9 Several states whose courts were bothered by this nuisance litigation enacted
legislation requiring a plaintiff holding less than a specified interest in the
corporation to give security for the litigation expenses of the corporation should
the suit prove to be unsuccessful. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Corn. LA-W § 61(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1965).
10 .38.3 U.S. 363, 371.
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of matters known to be false,1' would not lie against a verifier who
did not know that the facts alleged were not true.
The danger in such a situation comes not so much from the stock-
holder, who would probably not be so shrewd as to institute a "strike
suit," but rather from one who would capitalize on the stockholder's
ignorance in the hope of himself deriving a gain. In most cases, as
experience in several state jurisdictions has shown, this opportunist
would be the plaintiff's attorney. 12 The ill-advised plaintiff verifier,
immune from perjury, would suffer no ill effects; moreover, if a settle-
ment were reached, the unscrupulous barrister would harvest a hand-
some profit.
In a case such as the instant one, the sounder interpretation of the
rule would require verification by one not a party to the record who
is qualified to make a valid judgment on the truth of the allegations.
As Justice Harlan observed in the concurring opinion, "Rule 23(b)
directs that in a derivative suit 'the complaint shall be verified by oath'
but nothing dictates that the verification be that of the plaintiff share-
holder.""3 When a statute does not specifically state who shall make
the verification, the general practice allows it to be made by one other
than the plaintiff, "if he has sufficient knowledge of the facts."14 In
such instances, "a satisfactory reason should be stated for the failure of
the party to verify."'I
If vicarious verification for the uneducated stockholder is required,
fulfillment of the verification requirement becomes more than a mere
formality; the threat of perjury charges is again imminent. Because the
verifier in such cases, presumably the plaintiff's attorney, would be
disinclined to perjure himself, the deterrent function of the verification
requirement would be preserved.
Granted, the issue decided in this case was verification by the
naYve stockholder and not by another. But, as Justice Harlan suggested,
the Court could have accepted the sworn affidavit of the plaintiff's
"118 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964).
12 See WOOD, SURVEY AiD REPORT REGARDING STocKHOLDER's DEaVATrVE
Surrs 11 (1944). Wood points out that the only person to profit substantially in
a stockholder's suit is the plaintiff's attorney, who may take twenty to forty
per cent of any recovery, the balance being distributed among the shareholders.
Wood goes on to say that such fees may be among the largest in any field of
law, and the possibility of earning them is an inevitable inducement to find a
shareholder plaintiff by any means and to seize upon any colorable basis for a
suit. Since the lawyer's interest is paramount and the usual stockholder's interest is
virtually negligible, the real interests of the corporation and its stockholders are
unmistakably made subordinate to any advantage that can be gained by the at-
tomey, so that the usual controls of the plantiff's interest are entirely lacking.
1 383 U.S. 363, 374.
14 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 355 (1951).
IS Ibid.
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attorney in lieu of her verification to permit a furtherance of this
action.' At the same time, it could have stated that in the future
verification should be by one versed in the facts.
Richard 0. Stevenson
CnmiMNL LAw-AssAuLT AND BAT=rY-RESISTING IL cAL Au.-
The defendant, Kurt Koonce, was a bartender in New Jersey in May
of 1964 when police attempted to arrest him on the charge that he had
sold liquor to a minor. The bartender resisted and his mother helped
him in his brief struggle with the police, but they were rather quickly
subdued and Koonce was jailed. When he appeared in court, how-
ever, the charge of selling liquor to a minor was dismissed on the
grounds that a peace officer in New Jersey may not arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor which is not committed in his presence.
Still, Koonce drew a 90-day sentence on another charge of assault and
battery upon a peace officer. His mother was fined $50 for having
come to her son's assistance. Held: Judgment reversed as to the de-
fendants, but hereafter it shall not be lawful in New Jersey to resist a
police officer undertaking an arrest, notwithstanding the illegality
of the arrest. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (1965).
The doctrine of man's inalienable right to resist with all necessary
force an unlawful attempt to arrest dates so far back as to defy pin-
pointing. Historically, the Englishman has never minimized the un-
pleasant circumstances attendant upon even a short confinement in
prison, and English common law early found that resistance to false
arrest is a natural extension of the right of self-defense.' The doctrine
has been so completely accepted in American criminal law that, until
now, it has needed no qualification.
2
A private person has the right to resist an illegal arrest. He can repel
force with force. t does not have to be pat-a-cake force; the one madng
the illegal arrest is in the wrong and may be repelled. In the end, the
arrestee may take the life of the arrester in such a case if it becomes
necessary to do so in self-defense. 3
16 383 U.S. 363, 374.
15 Am. Jun. 2d Arrest § 94 (1962); 6 Am. Jut. 2d Assault & Battery § 79
(1962); 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 13 (1937); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 746 (1927) (elements of
resisting officer).
2 MORELAND, MODERN CmM An PRocErUR (1959); OMLD, CROMINAL
PRocmURE FRoM ARREST To APPEAL 27 (1947); 6 .J.S. Arrest § 92(d) (1937);
see State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260 (1950); People v. Cherry, 307
N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954); Robison v. U.S., 4 Okla. Crim. 336, 111
Pac. 984 (1910); State v. Rousseau, 40 Wdsh. 2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1954).
3 MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44.
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